Additional damages for copyright infringement
Under Australian law, victims of copyright infringement may be entitled to an account of profits or compensatory damages under s.115 (2) of the Copyright Act 1951 (Cth) (Copyright Act). Additional damages may also be available under section 115(4) of the Copyright Act. That section provides: (4)Where, in an action under this section: (a)an infringement of copyright is established; and (b)the court is satisfied that it is proper to do so, having regard to: (i)the flagrancy of the infringement; and (ia)the need to deter similar infringements of copyright; and (ib)the conduct of the defendant after the act constituting the infringement or, if relevant, after the defendant was informed that the defendant had allegedly infringed the plaintiff’s copyright; and (ii)whether the infringement involved the conversion of a work or other subject‐matter from hardcopy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine‐readable form; and (iii)any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant by reason of the infringement; and (iv)all other relevant matters; the court may, in assessing damages for the infringement, award such additional damages as it considers appropriate in the circumstances. The purpose of additional damages is to deter copyright infringement. The amount of additional damages awarded will depend on the facts of the case, such as the nature and extent of the infringement, the level of harm suffered by the copyright owner, and any aggravating or mitigating factors. It is worth noting that the award of additional damages is discretionary and not automatic, and that the copyright owner must prove their entitlement to such damages. Additionally, courts may consider other factors such as the infringer’s conduct, their level of knowledge of the infringement, and any steps taken to remedy the infringement when determining whether to award additional damages. Top Plus Pty Ltd v Mix Entertainment Pty Ltd [2022] FEDCFAMC2G 981 This case concerned Top Plus Pty Ltd who were applying for summary judgment against the first respondent, Mix Entertainment Pty Ltd, and the second respondent, Mr Yiren Wang, for infringement under ss 115 and 116 of the Copyright Act1968 (Cth) of copyright in certain cinematograph films owned by the second applicant, Universal Music Limited, and exclusively licensed to the first applicant, Top Plus Pty Ltd. The cinematograph films were karaoke music videos (KMVs). They comprised approximately 6,214 Chinese (both Mandarin and Cantonese) and English KMVs, and new releases of KMVs added from time to time, owned and controlled by Universal Music, released in Hong Kong and Australia, and/or supplied commercially in Australia in VCD/DVD format or electronic form (collectively, the KMV Films). Mix Entertainment had previously been accused of alleged unlicensed use of copyright in the KMV Films in infringement of applicants’ rights. That earlier dispute was resolved in 2012 prior to the commencement of suit by entry into a written non‐exclusive licence agreement between Top Plus and Mix Entertainment, signed by Mr Wang in his capacity as sole director of Mix Entertainment on 30 April 2012 (2012 Agreement). Pursuant to the 2012 Agreement, Top Plus permitted Mix Entertainment to offer the licensed content — the KMV Films — for viewing and singing by customers in up to 13 rooms at Mix Entertainment’s karaoke outlet ‘Mix Karaoke’ for the period of the licence. The 2012 Agreement expired on 31 December 2012. Compensatory damages which applied the licence fee test were awarded in the sum of $179,616.70. Principles governing an award of additional damages under s.115(4) of the Copyright Act 1951 (Cth) Reference was made to a summary of the principles relating to an award of additional damages at [717] – [721] of Microsoft Corporation v CPL Notting Hill Pty Ltd (No 7) [2022] FedFamC2G 590. In short, the principles are: First, it is not necessary that any amount of additional damages be proportionate to any award of compensatory damages. Secondly, an award of additional damages involves an element of penalty. Thirdly, part of the [function] of an award of additional damages is to mark the Court’s disapproval or opprobrium of the infringing conduct. Fourthly, the matters set out in sub‐s 115(4)(b) of the Copyright Act are not preconditions to an award of such damages. Fifthly, conduct that may properly be seen as flagrant (per s 115(4)(b), Copyright Act) includes conduct which involves a deliberate and calculated infringement, a calculated disregard of an applicant’s rights, or a cynical pursuit of benefit In addition: If additional damages are appropriate, the amount of damages to be awarded must operate as a sufficient deterrent to ensure that the conduct will not occur again. It should also be noted that, whilst additional damages encompass, they are not the same as aggravated or exemplary damages at common law. Specific deterrence has a role to play, including general deterrence. It is not always the case, however, that additional damages must be given, nor that they be such as to be given in an award and an amount as claimed by an applicant. Additional damages may be seen as encompassing broad concepts not always readily amenable to precise measurement or quantification. This includes having regard to capturing aspects of loss that have not been able to be ascertained because of the imperfect nature of litigation and evidence gathering in reflecting all aspects of wrongdoing and the total damaging effect of infringing or contravening conduct. It also entails giving a dollar figure to otherwise intangible considerations of punishment, giving effect to judicial disapproval and sanction and future‐looking considerations of specific and general deterrence. A key consideration when deciding to exercise the discretion afforded to the Court under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act is whether the infringement was flagrant. As noted by Beach J in Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Lucky Homes Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1217; 120 IPR 137 at [244] (citations omitted): [244]…in this context flagrancy means more than copying. It also means more than mere mistakes or carelessness. It connotes reprehensible conduct or scandalous conduct which may be demonstrated by deliberate and calculated acts of infringement. But it is not necessary to demonstrate a consciousness of copyright infringement. A consciousness of wrongdoing may be sufficient. In Truong Giang Corporation v Quach [2015] FCA 1097; (2015) 114 IPR 498 , discussing the relevant principles in the trade mark context, applicable also to the copyright context, per s 115(4)(b)(ib), Copyright Act) Wigney J said at [138]–[139]: [138]Sixth, post‐infringement conduct within s 126(2)(c) of the [Trade Mark Act 1995 (Cth) (TM Act)] is unlikely to include the respondent’s conduct of
Valuation of Minority Interests in Shareholder Oppression Claims
In Australia, shareholders who feel oppressed or unfairly treated by the company or its directors can seek remedies under various statutory provisions. Here are some of the remedies available to shareholders: Oppression proceedings under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): Under section 232 of the Corporations Act, shareholders can apply to the court for relief if they believe that the company’s affairs are being conducted in a manner that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or discriminatory to them. The court has broad powers to make orders to remedy the situation, including ordering the company to buy back the shareholder’s shares, ordering the company to pay compensation, or ordering the company to amend its constitution or replace its directors. Derivative actions under the Corporations Act: Shareholders can bring derivative actions under section 236 of the Corporations Act if they believe that the directors have breached their duties to the company. In such actions, the shareholder sues on behalf of the company to recover damages from the directors for any losses suffered by the company as a result of their breaches. Personal actions against directors under the Corporations Act: Shareholders can also bring personal actions against directors under section 180 of the Corporations Act if the director has breached their duty of care and diligence. This may occur if a director has made a decision that causes harm to the company, such as approving a risky investment without proper research or due diligence. Compulsory acquisition of shares under the Corporations Act: In some cases, shareholders may be able to force the company to buy their shares under section 461 of the Corporations Act. This may occur if the shareholder can show that they have been unfairly treated, and that it would be just and equitable for the company to buy their shares. The amount that is awarded will depend on the particular facts of the case. In BAM Property Group Pty Ltd as trustee for BAM Property Trust v Imoda Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1192, the Federal Court of Australia provided guidance on the principles that should be applied in valuing company shares in shareholder oppression claims. The following are some of the key principles: Compensation for oppression: The purpose of granting a remedy between parties in an oppression case is to “to compensate the oppressed shareholder for the oppression which has taken place”. Wide discretion: In cases where the relief to be granted is the compulsory purchase of shares, that object is achieved by the Court having a wide discretion to fix a price that “represents a fair value in all the circumstances”. That does not necessitate fixing a price only by reference to ordinary valuation principles. The question is to identify the price which should be paid in the circumstances. No benefit to oppressor for oppression: Where shares are to be valued as a starting point for determining the price which should be paid, the usual date for valuation is the date of the filing of the proceedings, but that is by no means a universal approach. The valuation does not value the shares at that date as if nothing but the ordinary course of business had preceded it. That would effectively allow the oppressing party the benefit of the wrongful conduct as, inevitably, that conduct has diminished the value of the oppressed party’s interest in the company before the proceedings are commenced. In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 324 , Lord Keith identified (at 364) that the valuation process must negate the effects of the oppressive conduct. His Lordship said the amount to be determined was: … what would have been the value of the shares at the commencement of the proceedings had it not been for the effect of the oppressive conduct of which complaint was made. This is clearly not a matter on which a calculation can be made with mathematical accuracy or by the application of strict accounting principles … Fair price to put applicant into position as if no oppression: A fair price would be the value which the shares would have had at the date of the petition, if there had been no oppression. In relation to the claim for oppression, when the court is valuing the oppressed shareholder’s interest in the determination of the relief to be awarded for oppression, the aim is to put the applicant in the position as if there had been no oppression. There are different methods of valuation that might be deployed, and there is no one size fits all answer. Quite often, the outgoing shareholder will have been excluded from management, leaving the remaining shareholders / directors “in control”. It is clear however from the authorities that the oppressors will not be entitled to benefit from the relevant oppression. Our corporate lawyers in Sydney specialise in dispute resolution relating to shareholder disputes and directors duties. Be prepared to have to issue proceedings before the other parties properly come to the negotiating table.
Shareholder Agreements – Avoiding Shareholder and Director Disputes
Table of Contents Shareholder and director disputes At the outset of a new business venture the risk of a dispute may seem far fetched. However, the practical reality that we often see is that disputes in one form or another frequently arise over time for example due to differences of opinion. These differences can easily result in complete deadlock in decision making. The prevailing desire for ultimate control over a prospering enterprise frequently results in oppressive conduct against minority shareholders for example by way of dilution of shares, exclusion from management, and so forth. These risks are elevated in the case of smaller “quasi-partnership” businesses with 50/50 shareholders and directors. Directors may find themselves in a position of conflict between their fiduciary duties on the one hand to the company, and duty of care to shareholders, and their personal interests. This may also result in causes of action or claims becoming available for the company against those directors who have breached their duties. Where there is a trust involved, beneficiaries may also claim that directors have been involved in a breach of trust, or the directors may be liable to the corporate trustee arising from their conduct contrary to the corporate trustee’s obligations as trustee for the relevant trust. The risk of expensive and protracted litigation is rife, despite the fact that it can frequently be avoided. Shareholder agreements You will find that the importance of a carefully crafted shareholder’s agreement cannot be emphasised more by any corporate lawyer. It frequently avoids the vast expense, stress and wasted opportunities that arise from and accompany bitterly fought disputes between shareholders / directors / beneficiaries. Shareholder agreements do so by making provision for various scenarios and circumstances which would otherwise be inadequately specified in the company’s constitution or under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Key issues typically covered include: More clarity on decision making of the business, reporting, and tailored voting rights Procedures and requirements for the payment of dividends Clearer obligations and responsibilities of each key personnel The direction and strategy for the business Share options and vesting of shares over time Procedures in the event of breaches or disputes Ultimately, mechanisms designed to prevent disputes but also providing for the sale / purchase of shares in various common scenarios, and dispute resolution procedures which can avoid substantial costs of litigation. In the absence of provision in this regard, the parties will be left to try to negotiate on a solution. Frequently, there are disputes over the terms e.g. the sale price of the shares, who the seller or buyer will be, etc. In the absence of agreement, the parties will need to consider administration or otherwise seek relief from the Court. Winding up on just and equitable grounds; a remedy of last resort Common actions include: Proceedings for oppressive conduct under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) where the applicant can show that the conduct of a company’s affairs or an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company or a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of a company is either: contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity. Proceedings alleging breaches of director’s statutory and common law duties or obligations under the constitution. Statutory derivative actions on behalf of the company against officers e.g. to recover money misappropriated and/or to liquidate the company if necessary. Proceedings seeking a broad range of other remedies including for the purchase of shares by any person, the appointment of a receiver, an injunction preventing the doing of an act, or an order for the company to be wound up on “just and equitable” grounds. In Re SP Private Holdings Pty Ltd [2021] VSC 142 (23 March 2021) the Victorian Supreme Court were fairly robust in the management of the timetable. Briefly, a 50% shareholder and director in a group of companies sought relief from oppression alleged to have been caused by the other 50% shareholder and director. The application was amended less than one month before judgement to seek the appointment of a provisional liquidator, relying on the just and equitable ground for winding up. In short, there was evidence of an extremely dysfunctional relationship between the parties, a bitter dispute, clear deadlock, and deep acrimony. Whilst the Court will be reluctant to wind up a solvent company (this being a rather drastic and last resort measure), there was no impediment to a just and equitable winding up in the circumstances. There was clear deadlock, deep acrimony, thereby rendering the continuation of the enterprise futile. There was no utility in a provisional liquidator being appointed and a winding up was ordered efficiently and in keeping with the overriding objective of the Court to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues. contact us Contact our corporate lawyers for assistance in relation to the above. Our commercial lawyers, business lawyers, and disputes lawyers provide expertise in corporate and commercial advisory services as well as litigation and dispute resolution, and specifically shareholder disputes. HEATHFIELD GROSVENOR Level 21, 133 Castlereagh Street Sydney NSW 2000 Australia T: +61 2 8005 7388 E: contact@hglaw.com.au www.hglaw.com.au The information provided in this article is provided by way of general information only. It does not constitute legal advice, and should not be relied upon as such. Specific independent legal advice should be obtained before deciding to act, or not to act, upon the views expressed or information contained in this article. Trustpilot Book Online Related services Related documents Get bespoke legal documents tailored by a lawyer quickly. Complete our intake form to get started so that one of our lawyers can contact you within 24 hours. Free startups and business essentials guides We have collated some free helpful guides containing key important considerationsClick Here to download our guides
Casual Workers Fair Work Amendment 2021 | HG Law
The Fair Work Amendment (Supporting Australia’s Jobs and Economic Recovery) Bill makes changes for casual employees.
Automation, artificial intelligence and legal issues
By Newyorka Musabelliu and Chris Chang – January 2020 It is not surprising that the law cannot keep up with the growth in artificial intelligence. Patent applications have already been filed on behalf of and in the name of a machine called Dabus that used AI to design two products[1]. Nevertheless, progress is being made regarding law reform in this space. In December 2019 the Australian Law Reform Commission released a report for law reform in connection with artificial intelligence over the next five years[2] and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) announced a public consultation process on artificial intelligence and intellectual property policy[3]. Below are some of the associated legal issues[4]. Table of Contents Key takeaways The implementation of different types of permanent controls, checks and balances on the AI which cannot be overridden is important given the different types of risks. The ALRC report notes recent commentary and states “appropriate design choices are crucial for automated systems to achieve consistency with concepts such as transparency and accountability; predictability and consistency; and equality before the law” and calls for effective regulation of technological developments. There are doubts as to whether mere principle based regulation will suffice and therefore the task of drafting such legislation will be both challenging and interesting. IP Law There are a multitude of issues to consider in view of the current landscape but, in summary, it is important to ensure the retention of personal control over the creative process and provide the input to at least a substantial part of the end result. Otherwise the risk is that you will lose rights in works authored by AI or jointly authored with AI unless reform addresses this. Reform debate primarily focuses on ownership where the work has been created by AI. Who should own the intellectual property rights (1) no-one (2) the AI, or (3) an interested party such as the producer. The latter is in our opinion the preferred option. In any other scenario this would be unsatisfactory to many businesses who have invested in AI and the fruits of the AI’s labour, including adaptations and compilations etc of those works. If left unaddressed, questions as to whether inventions presently created by AI can be registered as patents by persons other than the AI[5], or whether future applications based on such inventions are in fact already part of the prior art base and do not constitute inventive steps may also arise, and so forth. Who should be responsible for infringement by AI? We suggest the principles of agency law should apply. This question also opens the doors to liability for other positive acts of AI and questions concerning torts to the person for example which, given current advances in AI, is a possibility. Admin Law Even when automated systems are deployed carefully and effectively by government agencies, questions remain as to their compatibility with core administrative law principles and the rule of law. In particular, it is not yet clear whether (or how) such systems can be said to act with procedural fairness. The legality of actions and decisions by public bodies is called into question as is transparency and accountability of government decisions (in particular, whether automated decision-making software can provide adequate reasons that would in turn facilitate access to judicial and merits review where appropriate)[6]. The independent scrutiny of automated systems prior to implementation is already envisaged by the ALRC e.g. by way of algorithmic impact assessment[7] and therefore creators of AI are no doubt already focusing upon how to demonstrate compliance such tests if they havnt already done so. Privacy Law Information handled about individuals may not satisfy the definition of personal information under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) if the relevant person is for example allocated a code and is therefore not identifiable. Collection by AI may also occur without knowledge or consent (both of the public and the owner of the AI). Permanent checks and balances are likely to already be in place. Directors’ duties and defences It is important for directors to understand the technology upon which they place any reliance, and any limitations if they intend to rely on the safe harbor provisions contained in s.189 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Discrimination Studies have shown that inadvertent discrimination may occur in the AI’s implementation of its algorithms. Misuse of big data Other issues raised include the propensity for improper use of big data in the financial sector, and consumer law. The WIPO statement of issues goes into greater detail[8]. Discussion BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF AI As the phrase suggests, “artificial intelligence” (AI) is designed with the objective of imitating human intelligence artificially (and as has been proven, exceeding human intelligence in many ways, in the same way traditional computers have served us for so many years). Human intelligence includes accurate perception, analysis, logic / rationale, the ability to make calculated decisions based on objectives and, ultimately, solve problems. It also includes creativity. Machine learning has been available for years (e.g. for the purposes of electronic discovery in litigation). Algorithms are programmed in machines designed to learn both from large amounts of historic data and through their own, “personal”, experience and evolution, to make accurate predictions. Aside from significant advances in the use of artificial intelligence in the legal sector, we note some other examples of developments in recent times: The advanced use of AI as applied to gastrointestinal diagnostics. In particular, AI has been used in the “automated detection of disease and differentiation of pathology subtypes and disease severity[9]”; In October 2011, Takahiro Yamaguchi and So Kanno explored the link between the machine and art. The “Senseless Drawing Bot” is an autonomous device that sits on a skateboard which draws abstract lines using many colors. The robot moves from side to side, riding the wave of today’s modern graffiti. The lines drawn are complex and create abstract modern graffiti and one would have a difficult time arguing that the same work, if originally created by a human,
Unenforceable Penalty Clauses & Agreed Damages in Contracts
Table of Contents When negotiating a contract the parties commonly think about what should happen in the event that the other party breaches a term of the contract. They may also wish to stipulate what should happen upon the occurrence of a certain event (which may not technically constitute a “breach” of the contract). The other party might be required to pay an amount of money or provide some other non-monetary benefit as a result under the contract. Often it is difficult at the time the contract is made for a party to anticipate or foresee exactly what the damage or loss will be in the future if specified event(s) occur. Nevertheless, many contracts do specify what should happen upon the occurrence of certain events. Breach of contract If the parties agree on what will happen in the event of a breach of the contract, then the clause will either be (1) enforceable because it is a liquidated damages clause or (2) unenforceable because the clause is deemed to be a penalty. Primary contractual stipulations with secondary collateral stipulations Where a technical breach of the contract does not trigger what will happen but rather it is some other contractual stipulation / event which triggers payment, the question is “whether the party is restricted by covenant from doing the particular act [by] … payment”. This might occur for example through the imposition of a collateral contractual stipulation which imposes an additional detriment to the benefit of a party and acts as security for the performance of the primary obligation, or acts as a deterrent to non-performance of the primary obligation. Such a stipulation would be a penalty. Alternatively, the question is “whether according to the true construction of the contract, its meaning is, that the one party shall have the right to do the act, on payment of what is agreed upon as an equivalent[1]” it which case it would be enforceable. Enforceable agreed damages or liquidated damages clauses Generally, the law will enforce a clause which provides for the payment to a party of an amount (or benefit) which is a “genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage[2]”. Unenforceable penalty clauses In summary, clauses which are in the nature of a punishment for breach of the contract or to deter non-performance of a contractual term can be characterised as penalties and therefore unenforceable. Factors which indicate an unenforceable penalty clause include where[3]: The agreed sum is “extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach”. The sum needs to be out of all proportion to the damage that would normally be awarded by a Court in the absence of the clause (i.e. it is “in terrorem”). This is the most important test and merely because no pre-estimate was made at the time the contract is entered into does not determine that the clause a penalty[4]; or The breach consists only in not paying a sum of money, and the agreed damages are more than what should be paid as a result; or A single lump sum is made payable by way of compensation on the occurrence of one or more events, some of which may occasion serious damage but others insignificant damage. General principles It is important to keep in mind the following: The circumstances and the terms of the contract as at the time the contract was made are relevant, not the circumstances at the time of the breach of contract; The fact that it was difficult or impossible to precisely estimate the likely damage at the time the contract was made does not determine that it is a penalty clause[5]; The substance and effect of the clause must be considered (not merely the way the clause has been described in the contract); and The burden of proving that the clause is a penalty and unenforceable is on the defendant (i.e. the breaching / paying party). Special rules apply where payment is accelerated and damages for loss of bargain are payable (for example which often appear in hire purchase agreements). These are treated differently and specific legal advice should be sought[6]. A party seeking to rely upon an agreed damages clause would be best advised to draft the clause with the above in mind and to keep a note of the basis for the calculation and estimate of the damages. …………………………….. [1] See Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2012] HCA 30 and Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2016] HCA 28 (27 July 2016) [2] Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] A C 6. [3] See Amev-Udc Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170 and Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 [4] Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2016] HCA 28 (27 July 2016) [5] This was the fourth “test” from Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 [6] See Melbourne Linh Son Buddhist Society Inc v Gippsreal Ltd (No 2) [2017] VSCA 198 (4 August 2017) for a recent application of the principles. contact us Contact our contract lawyers for assistance in relation to the above. Our commercial lawyers, business lawyers, and disputes lawyers provide expertise in corporate and commercial advisory services as well as litigation and dispute resolution. HEATHFIELD GROSVENOR Level 21, 133 Castlereagh Street Sydney NSW 2000 Australia T: +61 2 8005 7388 E: contact@hglaw.com.au www.hglaw.com.au The information provided in this article is provided by way of general information only. It does not constitute legal advice, and should not be relied upon as such. Specific independent legal advice should be obtained before deciding to act, or not to act, upon the views expressed or information contained in this article.
Damages for Republication of Defamatory Statement by Third Party
Milne v Ell [2017] NSWSC 555 Home This case serves as a reminder of how liability for defamatory statements can extend to the republication of the statement by third parties, even where the republication has not been expressly authorised (but impliedly authorised). In summary, an original publisher will be liable for the repetition of his or her original defamatory publication, including in altered form where the republication adheres to the sense and substance of the original publication and: he or she expressly or impliedly requested or authorised the repetition of the original publication; he or she intended that the repetition should take place; the repetition is the natural and probable consequence of the original publication; or there is a duty or obligation on the recipient of the original publication to repeat the original publication. The defendant, Mr Ell, originally brought an action for defamation against the plaintiff, Ms Milne and Mr Ell was awarded $15,000 in damages plus costs in 2014. Shortly after the 2014 judgement, Mr Ell was contacted by a journalist to whom Mr Ell said (referring to Ms Milne) “She’s not a fit and proper person to be a councillor…” (Statement). This and other statements were subsequently published by the journalist in a printed article appearing in NSW and QLD as well as online. Ms Milne succeeded in obtaining an award of damages for defamation against Mr Ell arising from the Statement, and its subsequent republication by the journalist. In summary, it was held: Requirement of specificity of pleading imputations: The words “She’s not a fit and proper person to be a councillor…” referring to Ms Milne were sufficient by themselves to give rise to a defamatory imputation (i.e. they constituted an act or condition asserted of or attributed to a person). It was unnecessary for the pleading in the statement of claim to be more specific in the circumstances. Defence of honest opinion / fair comment: The imputation was one which related to a matter of public interest (because it related to whether or not a public officer was a fit and proper person to hold the position). On the question of whether or not the Statement was an expression of opinion rather than fact, the Court is required to examine the context, including whether the imputation is a “bare comment”, denuded of the facts upon which it is based or notorious facts presumed to be known by the reader, or without any of the other elements necessary to substantiate the defence. In the circumstances a reasonable recipient would understand the Statement as a statement of fact and not the offering of an opinion based upon stated facts. Accordingly, because the Statement was not an opinion and was not based upon stated facts, the defence of honest opinion / fair comment did not apply. Republication: The republication of the Statement made to the journalist was the natural and probable result of uttering the words in the Statement to the person (who was known to Mr Ell to be a journalist) and Mr Ell was therefore liable for its republication. In the circumstances of a press conference, or interview by the press, express authority or a request to publish is not necessary. Damages: In determining the amount of damages to be awarded in any defamation proceedings, the court is to ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of damages awarded. The purposes of an award of damages have been described as including: the consolation to the personal distress and hurt caused by the publication; reparation for the harm done to the personal and business reputation of the person defamed; and vindication of the reputation of the person defamed. If there had been no republication in this case then the damages would have been nominal (if any). In terms of the republication, the relevant publication issue had sales of approximately 36,000 newspapers and a readership of approximately 135,000. The online publication also caused additional damage and, in some respects, notwithstanding its withdrawal from the website, it may still be causing damage. The judge also accepted the “grapevine” effect of the publication of the article in print and the broadcasting of the website so that the damage was not confined to those that read the article or opened and/or downloaded the website article. Taking into account the fact that a public apology had been published by the publishers of the article (thereby vindicating Ms Milne to an extent), damages of $45,000 were awarded to Ms Milne plus costs. C
Fair Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Bill 2017
The Fair Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Bill 2017 (Bill) was introduced by the House of Representatives on 1 March 2017. A report of the Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee is presently due by 9 May 2017. It is anticipated that the Bill (in its current form or otherwise with amendments) will receive Royal Assent later this year. The Bill addresses the findings of various well publicised reports regarding the exploitation of workers (including migrant workers under temporary work visas). Briefly, the measures to be introduced include: Higher penalties[1] for “serious contraventions[2]” of various workplace laws[3] (to act as a deterrent); Prohibitions against employers unreasonably requiring their employees to make payments (e.g. requiring their wages to be paid back in cash); Making franchisors and holding companies[4] potentially liable for underpayments by their franchisees or subsidiaries where they “knew or could reasonably be expected to have known” that the contraventions, or similar contraventions, would at least be likely to occur and failed to take reasonable steps[5] to prevent them; Higher penalties for record keeping failures; and Increased evidence gathering / investigatory powers of the Fair Work Ombudsman. The following activities are examples of some reasonable steps which could be taken by franchisors and holding companies (who have a significant degree of influence or control over their franchisees or subsidiaries) to try to avoid a contravention of the Bill (if and when enacted), depending on the size and influence of the relevant franchisor or holding company: ensuring that the franchise agreement or other business arrangements require franchisees to comply with workplace laws. Consider appropriate amendments to your franchise manual for example; providing franchisees or subsidiaries with a copy of the FWO’s free Fair Work Handbook and information notices / circulars; encouraging franchisees or subsidiaries to cooperate with any audits by the FWO; establishing a contact or phone number for employees to report any potential underpayment to the business; and auditing of companies in the network. ……………………… [1] Up to $108,000 for individuals and $540,000 for corporations [2] Where the conduct constituting the contravention was deliberate (i.e. expressly, tacitly, or impliedly authorised) and part of a systematic pattern of conduct bearing in mind the number of contraventions, the period of time during which the contraventions occurred, the effect of the contraventions, and any other relevant considerations [3] e.g. contravening the National Employment Standards, a modern award, enterprise agreement, workplace determination, national minimum wage order, equal remuneration order, certain payment related provisions and record provisions [4] Who have a significant degree of influence or control over the affairs of their franchisee or subsidiary [5] The court will take into account factors such as the size and resources of the franchisor or holding company, their ability to influence or control, any action taken to ensure that the franchisee or subsidiary knew about their obligations under the specific workplace laws, any arrangements in place for assessing compliance with the specific workplace laws, whether there are any complaints related arrangements in place, and the extent to which compliance with the specific workplace laws is encouraged or required by the franchisor or holding company
Do I Need a Privacy Policy on My Website in Australia?
The answer is mostly likely “yes”, even if you are a small business with annual turnover of less than $3,000,000. Under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act), various types of entities are, in summary, required to comply with a prescribed set of 13 “Australian Privacy Principles”. The first principle requires a clearly expressed and up to date privacy policy, so that personal information is managed in an open and transparent manner. Government agencies, private and not for profit organisations including individuals (e.g. sole traders), companies, partnerships, unincorporated associations, and trusts are all required to comply. There are exemptions. For example, small businesses (i.e. those with annual turnover of less than $3,000,000 and which are not for example related to a larger company that is subject to the Privacy Act) might be exempt in limited circumstances. However, the practical reality is that as soon as small businesses handle any personal information and trade in personal information, they will be caught under the Privacy Act. Various other scenarios may also render small businesses liable to compliance with the Australian Privacy Principles (for example, small businesses who provide services to or on behalf of government agencies, those who are “reporting entities” (a broad category) under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), or those who operate residential tenancy databases etc). Furthermore, as soon as a business receives Tax File Number information about an individual (for example in a Tax File Number declaration upon the commencement of employment), certain obligations arise under the Privacy (Tax File Number) Rule 2015 (issued under s.17 of the Privacy Act). Employers for example would be best advised to ensure that they have a privacy policy (and consent covering purpose of collection, use, disclosure, storage etc) in place, compliant contractual clauses, and provide collection notices where appropriate. Non compliance with the Privacy Act can lead to significant fines. As a bare minimum, a privacy policy needs to cover the following: (a) the kinds of personal information that the entity collects and holds; (b) how the entity collects and holds personal information; (c) the purposes for which the entity collects, holds, uses and discloses personal information; (d) how an individual may access personal information about the individual that is held by the entity and seek the correction of such information; (e) how an individual may complain about a breach of the Australian Privacy Principles, or a registered APP code (if any) that binds the entity, and how the entity will deal with such a complaint; (f) whether the entity is likely to disclose personal information to overseas recipients; (g) if the entity is likely to disclose personal information to overseas recipients, the countries in which such recipients are likely to be located if it is practicable to specify those countries in the policy.
Protecting your brand & trade mark registration
Before choosing your brand: We have previously discussed important considerations when choosing the name of your business. Before you decide upon your brand (which may consist of a letter, word, name, number, logo, aspect of packaging, shape, colour, sound or scent) and launch it (including before you register your domain name) a trade mark availability search should be conducted by a professional to determine whether there are any existing registered or unregistered rights which may exist in similar brands. Benefits of trade mark registration: The mere registration of your company name or business name with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) does not protect your brand identity, or provide registered trade mark rights in your brand. Registration with ASIC is a legal obligation. However, registration as a trade mark with the Australian Trade Marks Office can provide your business with: an exclusive statutory monopoly to use your registered brand identity in respect of the goods and/or services for which it is registered in Australia; an easy way to prevent cybersquatting (the registration of a domain name which incorporates your brand by others); much easier and cheaper enforcement of your rights in your brand if someone else infringes your rights, for example, by using a brand which is either substantially identical or deceptively similar to your brand in respect of the same or similar goods and/or services; and a registered “asset” which can be licensed, assigned, and monetised. Only registered trade marks can apply the ® symbol. This puts others on notice that your brand is registered, and that you are likely to prosecute infringement. Costs: Your brand is your identity. It is valuable property to which your goodwill and reputation are attached. People who infringe your brand may derive benefits from your hard work or diminish your brand’s value through their actions (e.g. by selling inferior goods or services). Registration as a trade mark is typically a fairly inexpensive exercise if your brand does not currently infringe the rights of others (please refer to our earlier article here for further information). Goods and services are divided into “classes”. It is possible to obtain protection with IP Australia in one class for $330. This is a drop in the ocean when compared to the potential costs to your business of non-registration. Registration lasts for 10 years and is renewable. We provide trade mark registration advice and assistance at cost effective fixed fee rates.